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Local governance is an integral part of most modern states. Its role is generally to implement 
central government policy on a local level, to provide and manage local infrastructure such as 
roads, waste management and water supply, and to conduct government business on a narrower 
day-to-day basis.1
The extent to which local government has discretion when fulfilling these duties, depends its 
relationship with central government. Countries with a unitary government structure and which 
follow the Westminster System, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, tend to follow 
the so-called agency-model of local governance: local government is regarded as an agent of 
central government and thus has little discretion to act beyond the direction given by central 
government.
This model bears the danger of being detrimental to both local governance and democracy. 
A tightly controlled local council may overzealously enforce central government’s will to avoid 
its attention. It may thus become overly bureaucratic, to the detriment of its efficiency. A council 
on a tight leash will also diminish trust in local democracy. If local councillors are not free to 
represent their electorate, local elections are meaningless, and citizens become disengaged from 
local politics.
This danger is illustrated in the events surrounding the Canterbury regional council in the 
late 2000s. After accusations that it managed its water resources inefficiently, Parliament ousted 
the elected councillors and replaced them with commissioners, even though matters had been 
improving for years. This paper will assess the effects the agency-model has on local governance 
and democracy.
II  ThE AGENCY-MODEL OF LOCAL GOvERNANCE
Local government is a necessity within the constitutional structure of modern states.2 Central 
government is removed in terms of distance and duties from the needs and desires of the local 
population. It is usually more convenient and efficient to provide local services and decision-
making on local level. As such, the Local Government Act 2002 (NZ) (‘LGA’) states that the 
core services to be provided by local government are: network infrastructure, public transport, 
waste management, avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards, and recreational facilities and 
community amenities.3
The logistical difficulty for central government to govern over local matters was particularly 
obvious in the 19th century and early 20th century, when lack of long-distance transportation and 
communication made central administration of local infrastructure unfeasible. During that time, 
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local government was regarded as a quasi-autonomous political body, making decisions within 
its sphere of competency independently.4
However, the general trend for governments has long been to centralise their powers.5 The 
consequence of centralised power is loss of independence for local governments.6 The more 
power central government holds, the less likely it is to allow local government discretion when 
it comes to local decision making. This form of central-local government relationship is often 
referred to as the agency-model.7 It is characterised by the idea that all power is inherent in a 
central government and merely delegated to other political bodies at a central government’s 
discretion. Central government can therefore expand or limit the decision-making powers of 
local government as it chooses and interacts with local government in a form of command-
follow relationship, rather than a cooperative one.8 Consequently, powers that are extended to 
local government are generally strictly prescribed.9
But the agency-model of governance has been criticised for oversimplifying the central-
local government relationship.10 It does not recognise that while local government may 
ultimately be subordinate to central government, it nonetheless holds significant resources and 
wields substantial law-making and regulatory powers within its sphere of competency.11 As 
local government can freely make decisions within certain areas, it can still be regarded as 
broadly independent; as long as these areas of discretion coincide with the overall duties of local 
government, it does not matter that local government discretion is restricted elsewhere. Local 
government can act autonomously within the areas that matter.
In New Zealand, local government powers used to be strictly prescribed by the Local 
Government Act 1974 (NZ). That Act provided that any public services provided by local 
government were done so ‘on behalf of central government.’12 New Zealand has thus 
traditionally closely followed the agency-model.13 However, the LGA 2002 did away with the 
set of prescriptions regarding local government powers, and replaced it by a so-called power 
of general competence. It extends ‘full capacity’ to local government to conduct its business 
as long as it acts within the general principles of the LGA.14 This is particularly meaningful in 
light of local authorities’ broad bylaw-making powers. New Zealand local authorities may make 
bylaws relating to protecting the public from nuisance, and promoting and protecting public 
health, particularly in the context of waste and water management.15 The power of general 
competence combined with extensive bylaw-making powers appear to grant local government a 
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high level of discretion and could be regarded as a significant step towards true local autonomy.16 
In reality, the autonomy of local authorities in New Zealand remains severely limited due to two 
factors: the first is its ability to raise funds, and the second is the power of central government 
to interfere with local government business.
Until 2012, central government could intervene in local government affairs in New Zealand 
if: a local council lacked a quorum and was thus unable to act, if the council requested central 
government help, or if the council refused to perform its statutory duties and thus endangered 
good local government or public health and safety.17 Commissioners had been appointed by 
central government on few occasions, usually on the request by the local authority.18 Since 
December 2012, the LGA was amended to allow central government even broader powers of 
intervention as it can now intervene as soon as the Minister believes that a problem exists. 
‘Problem’ is defined in the LGA as: any circumstances that detract from a council’s ability to 
give effect to the purpose of local government, a persistent failure to perform its functions, and a 
failure to demonstrate prudent management of its finances, among other things.19 The reference 
to finances is particularly relevant, as local government has very limited ability to raise funds, 
and often operates within limited financial means.20 The powers of intervention in case of a 
perceived problem range from simple information gathering, to directing the council to act in 
specific ways. Ultimately, central government can relieve elected councillors from their duties 
and replace them with appointed commissioners.21
In terms of finances, the main income of local authorities come from local rates, a form of 
land tax.22 Local authorities can impose fees on the services it supplies; however, these may only 
compensate for the costs incurred by providing the service.23 Apart from investment revenue, 
local government has no other means to raise funds. If local authorities want to implement large 
and innovative projects or policies, they are often reliant on central government grants and 
subsidies.24 This creates a dependence on central government when planning for the development 
of new local assets; if central government contributes to the cost of the development, it has 
a justification to control the development.25 Overall, central government controls both local 
government’s responsibilities regarding its local population as well as its ability to raise funds 
to finance these responsibilities. This means that local authorities often have to operate within 
a very strict budget.26 Consequently, as s 256 LGA includes mismanagement of finances as 
a reason for central government to intervene, it is unlikely that a local authority will embark 
independently on a larger or innovative project. It has therefore been suggested that, in New 
Zealand, local government is nothing more than central government’s agent, or a ‘subordinate 
service delivery arm.’27
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Although the LGA allows local councils vast discretion by way of their power of general 
competence, local government in New Zealand nevertheless acts more as an agent than an 
autonomous entity. This spectre of central government intervention can inhibit independent 
decision-making at a local government level. This is particularly true in light of the fact that 
the New Zealand Parliament has legislated twice for the replacement of an entire elected 
local authority within 10 years.28 True independence requires a guaranteed freedom of outside 
coercion, be it through direct intervention or financial direction.
The reason that Parliament as one democratically elected governmental body can have 
complete control over local government, which is also democratically elected, is New Zealand’s 
strict adherence to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Unlike legislatures in many other 
constitutional systems, New Zealand’s parliament has no legislative superior and is thus not 
bound by any statute that organises and delineates the powers of New Zealand’s constitutional 
organs.29 It could be argued that Parliament should only legislate within the scope of the rule of 
law, and that democracy and the rule of law are intrinsically linked.30 However, as Parliament 
itself is democratically elected, it arguably acts within the rule of law when passing any 
legislation concerning local government as long as it follows democratic processes, the proper 
legislative process.
Therefore, the agency-model is still a useful descriptor when assessing the status of local 
government in relation to central government. It may be a simplified view on central-local 
government relationship, but it accurately expresses the power imbalance between the two 
government levels. The limited ability to raise funds, the ease by which central government can 
intervene in an invasive manner, and the ultimate power Parliament holds over local government 
mean that any independently acting council is in a precarious position.
III  ThE vALUE OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND  
ThE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY
Yet, just because Parliament can go as far as suspending local democracy and granting central 
government wide powers to interfere locally, does not mean that it should legislate to do so. 
Central government’s ability to replace elected councillors on a mere suggestion of a problem 
has an obvious impact on local democracy. It does not just rob the local population of their 
voice in local decision-making, it also diminishes local government’s authority and undermines 
people’s trust in local democracy generally. This is arguably true not just for the directly affected 
local people, but also for the people of other regions, because the example of central government 
interference illustrates the possibility that it could happen in their region, too. As such, central 
government interventions adversely affect the democratic health of the entire country.
Iv  LOCAL DEMOCRACY
Democracy requires citizens to self-govern, to take part in the decision-making process that 
determines society’s rules and policies, and to implement them.31 In a representative democracy, 
the people’s ability to self-govern is delegated to representative leaders, as the involvement of 
every citizen in large-scale societies is unfeasible. These representatives are elected by way 
28 See Local Government (Rodney District Council) Amendment Act 2000 (NZ); and Environment 
Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 (NZ).
29 Mark Elliott, ‘Interpretative Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten Constitution’ (2011) 
New Zealand Law Review 591; see also Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (Penguin Books, 2011), 161.
30 Bingham, above n 29, 66-67; 
31 Jack Lively, Democracy (Blackwell, 1975), 30.
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of democratic processes, to ensure that they truly represent their electorate and to hold them 
accountable for their decisions.32
Local democracy furthers accountability by facilitating pluralism and diversity among 
representatives. John Stuart Mill was concerned that despite these democratic processes, 
government tended to attract a certain group of people.33 This could result in a lack of diversity 
in government and a lack of choice between representatives. As only some people are interested 
in governing, the rest of the population would become less and less informed, and would 
eventually be unable to critically evaluate the actions of government. The result would be a 
progressively centralised government, in which minority groups had little chance to be heard.
Madison, who shared Mill’s concerns, believed that the solution was to create diversity 
by decentralising government.34 If governance is split and devolved to states or regions, more 
people are involved in the decision-making process, making it less likely that any particular 
interest group can gain disproportionate power. For this reason, local democracy is a vital part 
of overall democratic health. It distributes decision-making power across a wider range of 
representatives by creating more diversity.
Local democracy can also be beneficial to citizen engagement. As local governments make 
decisions that impact on the region more directly than many central government decisions, the 
local population is more likely to be aware of these decisions and of the representatives who 
make them. This means that a vote in local elections has a more tangible effect than a vote in 
general elections, as voters potentially have a better idea of how the council’s decisions affect 
them. If a voter can feel the impact of the vote more directly, they are likely to be more interested 
in local politics. This way, local democracy support people’s political self-development.35
v  LOCAL AUTONOMY
Local democracy will only be beneficial if local government can act independently. A council 
represents the will of the local population, but only if it has the power to make decisions at 
its own discretion. Otherwise, votes cast in local elections have little meaning, as the elected 
representatives are not free to act on behalf of their electors. In other words, the extent to which 
local government can act autonomously is a measure of democratic health.
Individual autonomy enables people to be self-determining: to be able to act free from any 
outside coercive force.36 Autonomy is a necessary part of self-governance; someone who makes 
decisions based on coercion is not in control of their own governance. Because the political 
autonomy of individuals has been delegated to representatives in modern democracies, their 
ability to self-govern has been reduced to casting a vote. In order to preserve their autonomy, the 
democratic institutions created through the electoral process must themselves be autonomous.37
While this is clearly the case for Parliament, it must also be the case for local government. 
It could even be argued that it is as important that local government is autonomous, if not 
even more so. Democratic institutions preserve individual political autonomy only to an extent. 
The further the representatives are removed from their electors, the less political autonomy is 
maintained. When central government makes decisions that affect only a specific region, the 
decision is not made solely by representatives of that region. Such decisions may therefore 
32 Held, above n 5, 75.
33 Ibid 83, 84.
34 James Madison, ‘Federalist Paper No. 10’ in Alexander Hamilton et al (eds), The Federalist papers 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 49-54.
35 Held, above n 5, 79; John Adler, ‘Efficiency, autonomy and local government’ (2001) 4(3) Journal 
of Local Government Law 61, 64.
36 Held, above n 5, 263.
37 Adler, above n 35, 63.
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potentially be imposed on that region against the will of the local population. For that reason, 
an autonomous, and democratically elected local council ensures political self-determination of 
individuals better than central government when it comes to local decision-making.38
vI  DEMOCRACY AND AUTONOMY  
UNDER ThE AGENCY-MODEL
A central government that perceives local government in terms of the agency-model is likely to 
be very directive, and local government powers will be strictly prescribed. This results in a lack 
of local autonomy and means that the local people enjoy less direct representation.
The agency-model may also have other harmful impacts on local government. It may, for 
example, cause a negative feedback loop that is detrimental to local government efficiency.39 The 
primary reasons for central government intervention are first, that local government is not acting 
in the interest of central government in terms of policy development and/or implementation, 
and second, that local government is not acting efficiently enough.40 To avoid intervention based 
on the former reason, local government is likely to try and do its best to stay within its narrowly 
prescribed competencies. That may lead it to become overly bureaucratic and risk-averse, as 
any show of independence may draw central government’s attention.41
Moreover, central intervention based on these reasons undermines local government’s 
authority. The lack of ability to act independently impacts on citizen engagement, as citizens 
come to regard local government as impotent and therefore unimportant.42 That can lead to 
the situation where in the eyes of the electorate, any short-coming with local government is 
blamed on central government, as with direct control of local government comes a shift of 
responsibility to central government. This, in turn, may cause central government to decide to 
further tighten the reigns on local government, so as to fix the short-comings which caused the 
electorates’ complaints. But stripping local government of further independence only cements 
the public’s perception that responsibility for local government lies with central government – 
and the vicious circle is complete.43 Overall, the less strictly the agency-model is applied to local 
government, the more democratic the system is and the more efficient local government can act.
vII  ENvIRONMENT CANTERbURY – A CASE STUDY
The events surrounding the passage of the Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners 
and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 (NZ) (‘ECan Act’) illustrate the deficiencies of 
the agency-model. In New Zealand, local government is divided into territorial and regional 
authorities, each of which has its own set of competencies.44 Environment Canterbury is the 
regional authority for the Canterbury region. Among other things, it is responsible for the 
management of the region’s water resources. Canterbury produces a significant part of New 
Zealand’s renewable energy by way of hydroelectricity. It is also an important agricultural 
region that relies heavily on Canterbury’s vast fresh water reserves. These reserves account for 
38 Command Paper (UK) “Communities in control: real people, real power” (9 July 2008)  
Cm 7427, 13.
39 Bailey and Elliott, above n 7, 450.
40 Ibid 454.
41 Palmer, Butler and Scott, above n 1, 189.
42 Bruce Hayward et al, The 2006 Local Elections and Electoral Pilot schemes British Market 
Research Bureau <www.electoralcommission.org.uk> (10 November 2017), 17.
43 Bailey and Elliott, above n 7, 451.
44 Local Government Act 2002 (NZ) s 21.
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more than two thirds of New Zealand’s fresh water.45 Consequently, water management is of 
high importance to the region.
A survey of all local authorities in 2008 revealed that Environment Canterbury was severely 
underperforming in terms of processing resource consent applications, particularly when those 
related to water.46 It processed only 29 per cent of resource consent applications within the 
statutory time limits set by the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) (‘RMA’), which was by 
far the worst record of all local authorities in New Zealand.47 Environment Canterbury also 
had not developed and implemented a regional water plan. While the RMA does not require a 
regional authority to devise such a plan, the importance of Canterbury’s water resources both 
to the region and to New Zealand as a whole, made such a plan highly desirable. Moreover, the 
lack of such a plan was believed to be a contributing factor to the slow response time to resource 
consent applications.48
After local mayors voiced their concerns regarding Environment Canterbury to the Ministry 
of the Environment, the Minister ordered a review into the performance of the council. The 
resulting report (Creech Report) found that Environment Canterbury’s inefficiency was the result 
of institutional breakdown, mainly caused by a council which it described as dysfunctional.49 
The council was split evenly along ideological lines, between environmental and economic 
interests. As neither side was seen to be interested to compromise, there was concern that the 
Council was unable to make difficult decisions. The Creech Report therefore recommended that 
the only way to improve Environment Canterbury’s inefficiency swiftly, would be to relieve 
the Council of its water management responsibilities and transfer them to a central government 
department.50
The reason for the Council’s slow response time to resource consent applications was 
likely primarily due to the number of resource consent applications it had to process. Consent 
applications had almost doubled in the previous years, due to a booming dairy industry and an 
unprecedented growth in urban development.51 Environment Canterbury was not sufficiently 
resourced to deal with this sudden rise in consent applications, which led to delays processing 
the applications. However, by the time the ECan Act was introduced in Parliament, Environment 
Canterbury had increased its consent processing staff and increased its rate of applications 
processed within the time limits to over 70 per cent.52
Regarding the water plan, the Creech Report noted that a plan had been in the early stages of 
development for some years, but that it was still a long way from being completed.53 The lack of 
progress was put down to the fact that the Council had bad relationships with the stakeholders 
and other public bodies of the Canterbury region, and that its internal ideological differences 
made it difficult to compromise on contentious matters.
However, while relationships between the Council and stakeholders were not always easy, 
according to independent research, both residents and industry representatives had a generally 
45 Wyatt Creech et al, Investigation of the performance of Environment Canterbury under the 
Resource Management Act & Local Government Act (CR84, 2010) I-II, 5; Dairy NZ, New Zealand 
Dairy Statistics 2014-15 <www.dairynz.co.nz> 13.
46 Ministry for the Environment, Resource Management Act: Two-yearly Survey of Local Authorities 
2007/2008 (ME 937, 2007), Appendix 4.
47 Ibid Appendix 4.
48 Creech et al, above n 45, 5.
49 Ibid 8, 9.
50 Ibid III.
51 Ibid 27.
52 Ibid 30; Environment Canterbury, Annual Report 2009/2010 (R10/112, 2010), 70.
53 Creech et al, above n 45, 6.
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positive attitude towards Environment Canterbury.54 Moreover, by 2010, Environment 
Canterbury had, in cooperation with the Canterbury Mayoral forum and the territorial 
councils, developed a water strategy. Unlike a formal water plan, this strategy stood outside 
the RMA process and relied on a collaborative approach to water management, rather than the 
adversarial approach of the RMA. Research by Holley and Gunningham showed that this kind 
of collaborative approach had been highly successful.55 All parties involved believed that this 
strategy could be developed into a more formal water plan in the future.56 The Council passed 
the resolution to adopt the water strategy by a vote of 10:2, showing that it could move past its 
internal ideological differences.57
It appears thus that Environment Canterbury had been operating somewhat ineffectively 
and inefficiently. But by the time the Creech Report was published, matters had substantially 
improved, and further improvement was likely. In any case, by 2010 Environment Canterbury 
was not the worst performing regional council anymore, which made the necessity of central 
government intervention doubtful.
Nevertheless, in March 2010 the New Zealand Parliament passed the ECan Act with the 
purpose of dealing with the perceived problems surrounding Environment Canterbury. The 
Act had a range of significant constitutional effects, but the most democratically harmful 
was the replacement of all Environment Canterbury councillors with government-appointed 
commissioners.58 The government’s reason for taking such drastic measures were similar to 
the ones put forward by the Creech Report.59 However, the government based their reasoning 
mainly on the data from the time when Environment Canterbury’s performance was worst, and 
ignored the improvements that had happened since. This was pointed out repeatedly by the 
opposition during the debates.60
This event illustrates the harmful effects the agency model has on local governance and 
democracy. Rather than having to cooperate with local government to achieve the best possible 
outcome for the population, central government can simply impose its will, with little regard to 
the mid- to long-term effects of such an intervention. Even though Environment Canterbury was 
processing 92 per cent of applications in time by 2011,61 it is arguable that only in November 
2016 was local democracy partially restored, when seven of thirteen councillors were elected 
during local government elections.62
The adverse effects of the ECan Act are likely to be wide-ranging. The ousting of councillors 
will undermine voters’ confidence that their local votes matter. Also, Local councils may be 
more timid and less innovative, because Environment Canterbury’s innovative approach to 
water management was over-ridden by central government.
54 Cameron Holley and Neil Gunningham, ‘Natural resources, new governance and legal regulation: 
when does collaboration work?’ (2011) 24(3) New Zealand Universities Law Review 309, 321; 
Environment Canterbury, Annual Report 2006/2007 (R08/57, 2008); Canterbury, Annual Report 
2009/2010, above n 52.
55 Holley and Gunningham, above n 54, 321.
56 Creech et al, above n 45, 19.
57 Ibid 50.
58 Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 
(NZ) s 9.
59 (30 March 2010) 661 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 9927 (Nick Smith).
60 See eg (24 March 2010) 661 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 9767 (Kennedy Graham); (30 
March 2010) 661 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 9930.
61 Ministry for the Environment, Resource Management Act: Two-yearly Survey of Local Authorities 
2010/2011 (ME 1069, 2011) Appendix 5.
62 Environment Canterbury (Transitional Governance Arrangements) Act 2016 (NZ); the remaining six 
councillors are still appointed by central government.
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Instead of intervening in the adversarial manner that the New Zealand Parliament chose, as 
a central government it could have supported Environment Canterbury. The ideological split in 
the Council was a sign of democracy in action, not a problem to be fixed. With more resources 
to deal with the influx of resource consent applications, Environment Canterbury could have 
processed (and did process) more applications in time.63 And the collaborative approach of 
the water strategy could have been supported and potentially used as a template for resource 
management reform. However, that is not how a principal interacts with their agent. If the agent 
does not act strictly within the expectations of the principal, the principal will impose their will 
on the agent, as happened in this situation.
vIII  CONCLUSION
The agency model of local governance is a sign of a political system in which power is highly 
centralised and focused within a central government body. This body wields full control and 
is unlikely to tolerate actions by other political bodies that may undermine its control. In 
such a system, local government cannot act independently. It must follow the will of central 
government, as it is seen as little more than an extension of central government.
This model comes at the detriment of local democracy. Even if local elections exist, their 
relevance is minute. An elected councillor who has to act within strict prescriptions may as well 
be an appointed bureaucrat. Consequently, citizens disengage from local politics, which in turn 
concentrates power even more in central government.
A model of local governance that facilitates and furthers local democracy is the so-called 
partnership model.64 Under this model, central government creates broad policy with the input of 
local authorities. The authorities then have wide discretion when implementing these policies. 
This ensures that central government can create policy beneficial to the whole country, but that 
such policy will not be unduly detrimental to the regions.
For the partnership model to work, local government needs a strong constitutional basis. 
If its existence and competencies are not protected, central government can impose its will on 
local government at any point. To this end, the association of local councils in New Zealand 
has suggested that local government should be more specifically constitutionally recognised; 
or, at least, that the LGA be entrenched.65 Palmer and Butlers even go so far as to challenge the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty altogether with their proposed Constitution for Aotearoa 
New Zealand which among other things, would guarantee the existence of local government, 
its autonomy within its legally defined areas of competence, and its democratically elected 
representatives.66 In lieu of broad constitutional changes, Bailey and Elliot suggest that a formal 
memorandum of understanding between central and local government as to their relationship 
and competencies could mitigate some of the adverse effects of the agency-model.67
The events surrounding Environment Canterbury and the subsequent increase of powers of 
intervention in the LGA, showcase the dangers inherent in the agency-model. If left unchecked, 
central government tends to increase rather than decrease its power, to the detriment of local 
government and democracy.
63 In fact, during the times that Environment Canterbury processed few applications, its staff had 
asked to be exempted from some of the RMA’s restrictions so that they could act more efficiently. 
The ECan Act extended exactly those powers to the appointed commissioners. Central government 
could have extended these powers to Environment Canterbury earlier, allowing it to act more 
efficiently without central intervention; see Creech et al, above n 45, 9, 10.
64 Harlow and Rawlings, above n 9, 84.
65 Taylor, above n 16, 181; see also Palmer, Butler and Scott, above n 1, 73.
66 Palmer and Butlers, above n 1, 73 (Art 110).
67 Bailey and Elliott, above n 7, 470, 471.
JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALASIAN LAW TEACHERS ASSOCIATION — Volume 10
LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND THE AGENCY-MODEL OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE  84
